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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
by
Yash P. Ghai
[Editor's Note: This report was written as a section of Professor
Ghai's longer paper, "State, Law and Participatory Institutions:
The Papua New Guinea Experience" which appears in Part I I of
this symposium. For purposes of organizing the material in this
symposium, this particular report (on indigenous business groups)
was transposed to this section, for it analyzes an interesting at-
tempt to use state law to foster development of "non-state" struc-
tures as a vehicle for participatory projects for rural development.
Readers are referred to the introductory sections of Professor
Ghai's first paper for discussion of the "historical and social con-
text" within which the legislation on business groups was developed,
and also to the concluding observations in that paper wherein he
comments more generally on the limitations and difficulties of at-
tempting to use the law and bureaucracies of the central state to
promote significant redistributions of power in favor of rural
people. ]
Business Groups
During the colonial era, as part of their efforts at self-improvement,
Papua New Guineans periodically attempted to enter into business activities
which extended beyond local and traditional occupations. However, histor-
ically, there were considerable difficulties impeding their entry into the
money economy. Few had the necessary resources or the possibility of
mobilising them. Serious involvement in monetary economic activities
could only be developed through group participation. Yet the forms of
business organisations allowed under the existing state law could scarcely
accommodate the kind of business group 1activities which were developed
within Papua New Guinean communities.
The two common forms of business organisations recognized by state
law were the company and partnership. The former has the advantage that
under it a legal body or personality is established, which is separate from
its members, whose financial liability is limited to the amount of their con-
tribution to the equity. One disadvantage lies in the complexity and expense
of organizing a company. Further, formation and management of a com-
pany requires skills that were often impossible to find within the community,
and would thus usually force a reliance upon intermediaries or expatriates.
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Also, the relationships between shareholders, directors and management
are such that formation of a company would have ill fitted the needs of
rural people. Moreover, if the number of members of a company exceeded
fifty, it must be registered as a public company with additional, onerous
requirements of maintenance and disclosure of accounts.
The partnership is a less formal arrangement, and there are fewer
legal requirements as to its formation and operation. But there are two
serious defects as regards its serviceability for our purposes. It does not
provide for the limitation of the liability of its members, so that if the
enterprise were to fail with outstanding debts, each member would be indi-
vidually liable for the payment. Second, a partnership may not exceed 20
members; otherwise it will be illegal. The resources that an average
Papua New Guinean was able to muster were so meager that if an enter-
prise could count for support from only 20 members, its capital would be
too low for any serious activity. Moreover, the desire of the Papua New
Guineans to enter into economic activities usually was not limited to the
profit motive.
A further possibility existed: the cooperative. This form does limit
the liability of the members, and it does not restrict the number of mem-
bers. However, while the cooperative principle may be said to be con-
gruent with customary concepts of shared activity, cooperatives in much
of the Third World (including Papua New Guinea) have seldom grown from
the grass roots. They are usually officially sponsored institutions encour-
aged in part to channel (and thus control) rural economic activity; and
pervasive official intervIntion in their activities has made them unattrac-
tive to the rural people.
A form of business group that would be suitable for the economic
activities of rural people, would have to meet several needs. Formation
of the group should be a simple procedure. There should be only minimal
requirements of filing annual reports or accounting, and a group's right to
operate should, as far as possible, not depend on state officials. The
concepts underlying the form should be readily comprehensible and based
as far as possible on traditional norms and practices. Decision-making
processes should be congruent with customary methods. The organisa-
tional form should enable the pooling of resources of a wide number of
people, and should enable membership not only of individuals, but also vil-
lages and clans as juristic persons. The liability of the large number of
members should be limited, although a higher degree of responsibility
might be demanded of those who manage the affairs of the group. Although
attempts have been made by some indigenous groups to use the company
form to achieve their goals, it is obvious that the above objects could not
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be implemented merely through the reform of organisations formed under
the existing, imposed law of business organisations.
Indigenous business organisations had appeared over a number of
years, operating with varying degrees of success, allegedly governed by
traditional norms. 4  Some of these indigenous organisations reflected
attempts of communal work-sharing groups to extend activities into the
monetary economy. Other group activities might revolve around projects
initiated by the leader of the group (the "big man" of Melanesian society).
Contributions would be collected by him from the members of the group and
invested (for the group) in a trade store or a transport vehicle or some
similar locally-based venture. Or resources would be collected on behalf
of and invested by a local collective entity, a "juristic person" in custom-
ary law, which symbolised the unity and corporate character of the group.
In all these instances, the project would be managed by one or more
persons, although various kinds of decisions could only be made or ap-
proved by the larger group. The rights of "managers" and members would
be determined by customary norms and expectations, and traditional
methods were used to determine disputes. But what these expectations
were, was not always clear; for example, the traditional expectation of re-
ciprocity and gifts from the "big man" could not always be easily translated
into a new business venture situation. When, as happened in one or two
instances, the group would be incorporated as a company, the relations
between the members would be regulated and governed by the legislation
with attempts to superimpose customary obligations and expectations upon
them.
Experience suggested various advantages in working through such
customary institutions. A whole community could become involved in a
customary business group. It was a form which could be easily understood;
it was easy for people to identify with it. As the relations of the members
inter se were governed by customary norms, there was a better under-
standfi-g of them than might be the case, if the relations were governed,
for example, by company law. Procedures were simple and little paper
work was involved. There was at least some significant measure of pop-
ular participation in decision making. There was little involvement or
interference by state officials, and there were corresponding valued ele-
ments of autonomy and self-governance of these enterprises.
There were, however, some drawbacks. The very ambiguity of the
obligations and expectations that arose from the translation of traditional
customary transactions into a monetary and commercial context could
Editor's Note: For discussion of the role of the "Big Man" in Papua New
Guinean society, see Professor Ghai's paper in Part II of this symposium.
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create situations which could be exploited by the managers, and allega-
tions were sometimes made that a "big man" had abused his position--using
communal funds for what were essentially personal enterprises, and buy-
ing off pressures for distribution and sharing by making token gifts or by
creating a social distance between himself and the rest of the community.
In such cases, enforcement of customary obligations through traditional
methods would be difficult, and the formal courts might either have no
jurisdiction or lack the necessary evidence to resolve claims. But it was
when groups dealt with outsiders that some of the drawbacks were most
highlighted. It was difficult for a group to obtain credit if it had no legal
personality recognized by state law. This would reduce the value of any
security for the loan or credit, although it is probable that the presence of
legal personality would not have enhanced the credit worthiness of the
group in the "modern" private sector. As far as official agencies were
concerned, it might be thought that the absence of a formal personality
would not matter, but the attitude taken by legal officers was that these
groups were illegal (rather than extra-legal), and any support to them by
a state official would open him to charges of conspiracy.5 Denied outside
credit, the group's potential as a commercial enterprise was severely
limited. Lack of legal personality could also make it difficult for groups
to collect contributions from members, 6 to enter into transactions in the
name of the group and to hold property on its behalf. As the business of
a local group expanded, the absence of a proper legal status was a serious
handicap. If a group wanted to play a meaningful role in commercial
affairs, it would have to cross the border from customary to official law.
But if the only alternatives were to become a company or a cooperative,
the group would be seriously changed and unable to rely upon traditional
practices.
The Business Groups Act was passed in order to enable groups to
become juristic entities without unduly changing their traditional charac-
teristics. The Act states that its basic purpose is to promote "greater
participation by local people in the national economy by the establishment
by them of business groups and other economic enterprises. "7 It enables
customary groups (as groups) to become juristic persons for purposes of:
entering into legal transactions with outsiders; holding land (except cus -
tomary land) or other property; suing (and being sued) in its corporate
name; mortgaging its property in order to raise loans. The group can
determine the activities it wishes to engage in, and these must be set out
in its constitution, which must be submitted with an application to be
registered as a business group. The constitution can thereafter be
amended to enable the group to engage in different activities, but the Act
itself prohibits a few kinds of group activities, for example: raising
money from the public. A few rules are laid down for the protection of
the finances of the members and outsiders who deal with the group: the
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group has to open a bank account, it has to issue receipts for all capital
moneys collected by or on behalf of the group; it has to prepare annually
statements of assets and liabilities and lodge it with the registrar (who may
also give the group instructions as to the manner in which accounts and
records of the group should be maintained). Charges against the group's
assets can be registered, and they have a priority in case of winding up--
a provision which, in theory, facilitates loans to the group.
The group may be wound up on the order of the Registrar for a number
of reasons: if the members so desire, if a creditor requests it, or if the
dispute settling authority (for which see below) concludes that the continued
existence of the group is unlikely or undesirable. The registrar can also
order the winding up of the group on his own initiative if he is satisfied
inter alia, that the group is unable to meet its debts, that its conduct is
oppressive to any of its members, that the group has failed for two suc-
cessive years to produce annual statements of assest and liabilities, or
that for some reason the group ought to be incorporated as a company or co-
operative.
The liability of a member is limited to the amount of his interest in the
property of the group, plus any amount owing by him to the group, although
this rule could be displaced or modified through the group constitution or by
the applicable customary law. The group is required to have a committee
(or controlling body by another name) which must have a minimum number
of three members. The liability of a member of the committee is unlimited,
in respect of transactions when he was a member of the committee. The
combination of the limited liability of the members of the group but the un-
limited liability of those charged with the management of the affairs of the
group (analogous to a limited partnership) is consistent with the reality of
these groups when a large number of families and individuals contribute to
the capital of the venture, but a few leaders manage the affairs.
The Act has attempted to keep formalities to a minimum, and an
application for incorporation can be made orally. It requires few trans-
actions to be recorded in writing. It says relatively little about the rights
and obligations of members inter se or between the members and the com-
mittee. A great deal of freeom i1sgiven to the members to adopt rules
which they want to govern in their own relationships and procedures. It is
assumed that many of these matters can be determined by the relevant
customary law of the group, and a group may specify in its constitution the
customs it wants to adopt. In order to minimise outside interference in the
internal affairs of the group, and to ensure the application of customary law,
each group is required, as a condition of incorporation, to specify at least
one dispute settling authority. This could be one or more persons identi-
fled by name, office or an agreed procedure. Intra-group disputes have to
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be referred to this authority, the courts have no jurisdiction unless the
constitution specifically identifies disputes to be resolved by a court. In
either event, the authority or the court is not to apply any rule of law
(other than the Act) but endeavour to "do substantial justice between all
persons interested in accordance with this Act, the constitution and any
relevant custom. "8 In keeping with this aim, appeals are to be deter-
mined by internal authorities.
It is clear that in many ways the Act has attempted to maintain the
traditional nature of the group and to enable it to operate with the advan-
tages that come from incorporation while at the same time keeping to a
minimum legal or accounting formalities. Some of the shortcomings of the
legislation should, however, be pointed out. First, the notion of providing
legal underpinning for traditional groups has been carried to an excess in
the rule that a group cannot be incorporated unless all the proposed mem-
bers belong to the same customary group. Since ethnic groups in Papua
New Guinea tend often to be small, this can be a serious restriction. The
restriction also reduces the value of the legislation in urban areas where
a group may well be part of a new "community," but may have come from
different parts of the country. Second, despite the intention and attempts
to make the group as autonomous as possible, the state officials, mainly
the registrar and his agent, have considerable control over incorporation
and operation. The registrar, can, for example, refuse incorporation if
he is satisfied that the group characteristics are so "temporary, evanes-
cent or doubtful that the group does not have a corporate nature," or "that
some other form of incorporation or of organisation under some other Act
would be more appropriate and effective."
There is no study on the operation of the business groups. The
following impressions and analyses are based in large part on the examina-
tion of official documents, interviews with officials responsible for the
implementation of the legislation, both at the capital and the provinces,
members of provincial governments, and a few persons who have acted as
advisors to business groups.
There is evidence to suggest that the business groups are popular. In
mid 1978, four years after the Act came into effect, over 800 groups had
been registered, and applications were pending in respect of another 800
proposed groups. A great many more had applied for registration than
were incorporated; in one district only one in ten applications was even-
tually successful, while in another only three out of 25 were registered.
Groups seek to register themselves under the legislation because thereby
they get a status in law, which enables them to deal with the state officials
and to benefit from official schemes of loans and licenses, especially in
view of the declared public policy of favouring groups over individuals.
-199-
Another reason for incorporation is that it strengthens the group or
corporate character of, say, a village community, and some constitutions
have carefully provided for the representation of various age and interest
groups in the committee as well as of elders in the dispute settlement
authority. In this way some of the younger members of a community have
been able to harness the resources and energies of the community for com-
mercial economic activities or other forms of self-improvement. Some-
times a group has sought incorporation to make clear the rights of mem-
bers, so as to prevent exploitation of a community by a "big man." At
other times, in contrast to the above aims, a group has sought incorpora-
tion to distance itself from the rest of the community, so that it does not
have to share the fruits of its efforts with it; the legal demarcation that
incorporation brings about limits the group which has a right to share in
the profits. Some villages have organised themselves into groups so that
they can, as a collectivity, buy shares in large companies, and in fact one
of the largest indigenously-owned companies now has only business groups
as its shareholders. If the total number of such groups can be kept down to
50, the company is able to take advantage of incorporation as a private com-
pany, thus avoiding several formalities of reporting, accounting and disclo-
sure, while at the same time involving a large number of people in owner-
ship. Provincial governments which have been anxious to support collective
as opposed to individual entrepreneurship, have encouraged the formation of
groups. In one or more instances, when the government has had to dis-
tribute timber royalties to the residents of an area, it has organised them
into a group; the royalties are then paid to the group which has the respon-
sibility for distributing it among its members in accordance with proprie-
tory rights under customary law.
Most groups engage in small-scale activities: running a trade store,
occasionally a plantation or fermentary, fishing, transport, vegetable pro-
duction, crocodile farms, cultivating cash crops, and in at least one in.-
stance, running a cinema. In some of these the members are fairly
passive, the initiative and management left to one or more members of the
committee. Others are based on collective participation in production, and
these tend also to be run on the basis of collective decision making. Typi-
cally these are village based, and their activities encompass a variety of
efforts, from commercial to communal education and self-improvement. In
some areas, therefore, the groups have reinforced communal values and
identity, while in others they have contributed to their erosion, and are
taking on increasingly the characteristics of a normal commercial com-
pany. There were fears that "big men" would use the group as a front, in
order to exploit the members as well as to benefit from the government
schemes in favour of collective enterprise. It is difficult to tell if this has
happened. Some groups have been initiated by "big men," and by others who
wanted to stake claims to leadership in the community. But it is not clear
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that they have exploited the people; although it is not improbable that some
big men have claimed rather special rights for themselves, and members
who questioned their actions were told to take their contribution and leave
the group.
While legislation has thus provided a channel for the initiatives and
activities of the rural people, without too much of a disruption of traditional
concepts and procedures (at least in some instances), we should note an
important aspect of the way the law has operated. The legislation has
brought the communities securely within the ambit of the state. Now when-
ever a community or group of individuals want to cooperate on a project,
they are advised (whether by public servants or the educated members of
the community) to form a group under the legislation. The pressure to
form the group is high if the groups want a loan, and indeed that is an im-
portant reason to incorporate; almost all groups have some sort of state
loan.
Officials have been posted to all the provinces to help people who want
to form groups. They decide whether the business group is the most suit-
able form. If they consider that the company form would be more appro-
priate, they can deny the group incorporation. In practice, if the group is
urban-based, or if some complex undertaking is contemplated, or if large
sums of money are involved, the officials are likely to recommend the
formation of a company. Although the legislation is intended to provide a
simple procedure for the establishment of the group, the process has be-
come highly bureaucratic and various forms have to be completed. There
can be long delays in getting registered; sometimes as long as a year. As
one lawyer who has helped various groups to register has said: "What was
supposed to have been an easy method of registering customary-type cor-
porations, is now as complex as company or cooperative society forma-
tion. "9 Once a group is registered, official involvement in its operations
continues. Getting a loan for a group means that it has to satisfy various
officials of its viability and the feasibility of the project. It is not clear how
far the registrar's supervisory functions are in fact exercised and it is
probable that this is so far limited (a paradox of failed bureaucratisation).
If the power were exercised, the groups would be further drawn into a net-
work of bureaucratic guidance and controls, which would adversely affect
the groups' autonomy and self-reliance -- underlying assumptions of the
legislation.
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